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ByteShares.org

Operations

Security & Threat Model

Documented architecture

Proposed / Non-operational security design considerations and open verification needs. This is not a security audit, an assurance report or a statement that controls are implemented. No independent audit, penetration-test, formal-verification or certification evidence is on file.

Source / verification
Existing public architecture, proposed canon and evidence-gap register; design summary only, verification unchanged
Document version
Not yet assigned
Last reviewed
7 October 2026

Security posture — evidence not on file

External security audit
No independent report on file
Penetration test
No assessment evidence on file
Formal verification
No proof or assessment on file
Certification
No certification evidence on file
Bug bounty
Not operating
Incident history
No verified DLT operational incident record; not a claim of incident-free operation

Threat-model review scope — design considerations only

Protected interests in the proposed model are scoped authority, interpretable history, evidence availability and minimal disclosure. Review boundaries include subjects and issuers, governance decision-makers, node operators, evidence custodians and replaceable interfaces. An accepted deployment scope and adversary model have not been established.

The threat-to-layer trace below identifies conceptual dependencies and evidence needed, not risk rankings, tested mitigations or accepted residual risks. Implementation-specific attack paths, trusted roots, revocation freshness, operator powers, custody and recovery require specifications and independent assessment.

Before stronger security claims: establish approved scope and accountable reviewers; supply implementation and test evidence; assess the controls and unresolved risks; approve disclosure and incident responsibilities. Canon adoption alone satisfies none of these steps.

Proposed security objectives — not implemented guarantees

  • Integrity of history — an accepted record cannot be silently altered or removed.
  • Attributable authority — every consequential action traces to an authority that was valid at the time.
  • Minimal disclosure — verification should not require exposing unrelated source data.
  • Reconstructability — an independent party can rebuild the outcome from retained evidence.
  • Containment — compromise of one component must not confer authority elsewhere.

Trust boundaries

Trust boundaries and the assumption each one rests on
BoundaryCrossing dataAssumption
Subject → identity layerCredential presentation and proofs.Issuer and revocation status are independently checkable.
Identity → authorizationEligibility and mandate proofs.A proof grants only the scope it names.
Governance → protocolAuthorized rules and role grants.Authority records are current and verifiable.
Protocol → storageAnchors and evidence references.Anchors commit to evidence without disclosing it.
Protocol → interfacesRead responses and submissions.Interfaces are replaceable and hold no authority.
Protocol → external chainsBridge references, where ever adopted.External finality and custody are weaker assumptions than internal ones.

Authentication versus authorization

Authentication

Documented architecture

Establishes which subject or agent is presenting itself. It answers who, and nothing more. Holding a key proves control of that key, not entitlement.

Authorization

Documented architecture

Establishes whether that subject may perform this action, under this rule version, within this scope and period. It is granted explicitly and never inferred from authentication.

Identity-bound permissions

Documented architecture

Permissions attach to a verified identity and an authorized mandate together. Transfer of a key does not transfer a mandate.

Account and key distinction

Documented architecture

An account is the accounting subject; a key is a control mechanism over it. Key rotation must be possible without a change of subject.

Key and account security

  • Key custody model, rotation procedure and recovery path are not decided.
  • No hardware, wallet, signature scheme or curve is specified or endorsed here.
  • Loss and compromise handling is a requirement without a written procedure.
  • Administrative keys, if any exist in an implementation, must be enumerated and their powers bounded and logged.

Protocol and administrative authority assumptions

Any implementation must enumerate administrative powers, their holders, scope and evidence of use. No implementation or operator-authority inventory has been accepted here. A reduction of administrative power cannot be assumed or promised; it requires explicit governance decisions and verifiable controls.

Threat categories

Threat categories, intended mitigations and open questions
CategoryIntended mitigationOpen question
Unauthorized state changeExplicit authority checks against authorized rule versions.Enforcement mechanism not implemented.
History rewritingAppend-only entries with linked compensating corrections and epoch anchors.Anchor cadence and snapshot format to be specified.
Credential forgery or replayScoped, verifiable proofs with issuer and status checks.Credential and revocation formats undecided.
Key compromiseBounded scope, revocation, and rotation independent of subject identity.Custody and recovery model undecided.
Operator collusionNamed accountability, independent observers, reconstructable evidence.Operator set and removal path undecided.
Evidence loss or unavailabilityReplicated retention with content-addressed references.Retention obligations and durability rail not fixed.
Bridge and cross-chain downgradeTreat external references as weaker evidence; no reliance on them for internal integrity.No bridge exists; conditions for adopting one unwritten.
Interface substitution or spoofingInterfaces hold no authority; verification is possible without them.Independent verification tooling not built.
Privacy overreachMinimal disclosure and selective presentation.Data classification not completed.

Conceptual threat-to-layer trace

Proposed / Non-operational — documentation coverage, not a completed threat assessment or verified mitigation.

Threat categories traced to existing conceptual dependencies and missing evidence
Threat concernDocumented dependencyAssessment still required
Forgery, replay and excess authorityCredential and mandate lifecycleIssuer trust, freshness, delegation and revocation specifications; attack scenarios and enforcement tests.
History rewriting and evidence lossAppend-only history, snapshots and custodySnapshot/finality and retention specifications; reconstruction and availability test evidence.
Collusion and unauthorized rule changeNode roles and trust boundariesApproved operator/governance scope; removal/reconciliation procedure and independent control assessment.
Spoofed interfaces and privacy overreachProof interpretation and offline intentTrusted-root and data-classification decisions; disclosure analysis and verifier test vectors.
External-chain downgradeConditional bridge conceptsTechnical/legal/custody adoption conditions and external-finality assessment; no bridge or internal integrity guarantee.

Existing objectives and invariants explain intended controls, not their efficacy. System and asset scope, attack analysis, residual risks and control validation require a supplied threat model and implementation evidence. Audits, penetration tests and certification remain absent.

Proposed security constraints — not adopted guarantees

  1. No accepted entry is mutated; correction happens through a linked entry.
  2. No action is authorized without a rule version and an authority reference.
  3. No interface is ever the source of truth.
  4. No proof grants scope beyond the one it names.
  5. No administrative power exists without being enumerated and recorded.
  6. No verification step requires disclosure of unrelated source data.

These are stated constraints for an implementation, not properties of a running system.

Data and storage considerations

Anchors are public and compact; durable evidence stays under explicit custody and retention control. Classification of which material may be anchored, which may be referenced and which may never leave custody is an open item, and is a prerequisite for any storage rail decision.

Scope of this platform

This site is documentation. It holds no accounts, no payment data and no member records; those belong to ByteShares.dk and are outside the scope of these pages.

Reporting a problem

A coordinated disclosure process requires owner-approved responsibility, a verified contact route and a defined response policy. These remain open; no response time, bounty or future publication date is promised. This page is not an operating vulnerability-reporting service.

Open questions / evidence required

Proposed / Non-operational — review questions, not decisions or implementation contracts.

What is needed beyond the conceptual threat map?
TBD / Requires source: System/asset scope, data classification, attack scenarios, control design and residual-risk review, then independently assessed implementation evidence; no audit is claimed.
Who receives and handles a security report?
TBD / Requires source: Ronny's decision naming a staffed recipient/contact route, scope, handling owner, response commitment and disclosure/escalation rules.
How are key compromise and recovery assessed?
TBD / Requires source: Custody, rotation/recovery and bounded administrative-power procedures plus test evidence; no curve, wallet or scheme is selected.
Documentation-gap audit and evidence boundaries

Evidence register

Each statement on this page is tracked against a source. A claim without a verified source is never presented as fact.

Claims on this page and the verification state of their sources
ClaimSource typeVerificationNote
Security objectives, boundaries and invariantsInternal design notesSource claimed, not yet verifiedExisting public design summaries and Proposed Canon provide review context; source fidelity, adoption and implemented control verification remain separate and unresolved.
Threat categories and mitigationsThreat model documentNo source on fileNo accepted, implementation-specific threat assessment is on file. The public tables are design considerations and evidence requests, not security findings.
Any audit, test, certification or clean bill of healthAudit reportNo source on fileNo independent report is on file; no assurance is given.