Authentication
Documented architectureEstablishes which subject or agent is presenting itself. It answers who, and nothing more. Holding a key proves control of that key, not entitlement.
Live technical information site. The planned DLT is not live; membership is on ByteShares.dk.
Operations
Proposed / Non-operational security design considerations and open verification needs. This is not a security audit, an assurance report or a statement that controls are implemented. No independent audit, penetration-test, formal-verification or certification evidence is on file.
Protected interests in the proposed model are scoped authority, interpretable history, evidence availability and minimal disclosure. Review boundaries include subjects and issuers, governance decision-makers, node operators, evidence custodians and replaceable interfaces. An accepted deployment scope and adversary model have not been established.
The threat-to-layer trace below identifies conceptual dependencies and evidence needed, not risk rankings, tested mitigations or accepted residual risks. Implementation-specific attack paths, trusted roots, revocation freshness, operator powers, custody and recovery require specifications and independent assessment.
Before stronger security claims: establish approved scope and accountable reviewers; supply implementation and test evidence; assess the controls and unresolved risks; approve disclosure and incident responsibilities. Canon adoption alone satisfies none of these steps.
| Boundary | Crossing data | Assumption |
|---|---|---|
| Subject → identity layer | Credential presentation and proofs. | Issuer and revocation status are independently checkable. |
| Identity → authorization | Eligibility and mandate proofs. | A proof grants only the scope it names. |
| Governance → protocol | Authorized rules and role grants. | Authority records are current and verifiable. |
| Protocol → storage | Anchors and evidence references. | Anchors commit to evidence without disclosing it. |
| Protocol → interfaces | Read responses and submissions. | Interfaces are replaceable and hold no authority. |
| Protocol → external chains | Bridge references, where ever adopted. | External finality and custody are weaker assumptions than internal ones. |
Establishes which subject or agent is presenting itself. It answers who, and nothing more. Holding a key proves control of that key, not entitlement.
Establishes whether that subject may perform this action, under this rule version, within this scope and period. It is granted explicitly and never inferred from authentication.
Permissions attach to a verified identity and an authorized mandate together. Transfer of a key does not transfer a mandate.
An account is the accounting subject; a key is a control mechanism over it. Key rotation must be possible without a change of subject.
Any implementation must enumerate administrative powers, their holders, scope and evidence of use. No implementation or operator-authority inventory has been accepted here. A reduction of administrative power cannot be assumed or promised; it requires explicit governance decisions and verifiable controls.
| Category | Intended mitigation | Open question |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized state change | Explicit authority checks against authorized rule versions. | Enforcement mechanism not implemented. |
| History rewriting | Append-only entries with linked compensating corrections and epoch anchors. | Anchor cadence and snapshot format to be specified. |
| Credential forgery or replay | Scoped, verifiable proofs with issuer and status checks. | Credential and revocation formats undecided. |
| Key compromise | Bounded scope, revocation, and rotation independent of subject identity. | Custody and recovery model undecided. |
| Operator collusion | Named accountability, independent observers, reconstructable evidence. | Operator set and removal path undecided. |
| Evidence loss or unavailability | Replicated retention with content-addressed references. | Retention obligations and durability rail not fixed. |
| Bridge and cross-chain downgrade | Treat external references as weaker evidence; no reliance on them for internal integrity. | No bridge exists; conditions for adopting one unwritten. |
| Interface substitution or spoofing | Interfaces hold no authority; verification is possible without them. | Independent verification tooling not built. |
| Privacy overreach | Minimal disclosure and selective presentation. | Data classification not completed. |
Proposed / Non-operational — documentation coverage, not a completed threat assessment or verified mitigation.
| Threat concern | Documented dependency | Assessment still required |
|---|---|---|
| Forgery, replay and excess authority | Credential and mandate lifecycle | Issuer trust, freshness, delegation and revocation specifications; attack scenarios and enforcement tests. |
| History rewriting and evidence loss | Append-only history, snapshots and custody | Snapshot/finality and retention specifications; reconstruction and availability test evidence. |
| Collusion and unauthorized rule change | Node roles and trust boundaries | Approved operator/governance scope; removal/reconciliation procedure and independent control assessment. |
| Spoofed interfaces and privacy overreach | Proof interpretation and offline intent | Trusted-root and data-classification decisions; disclosure analysis and verifier test vectors. |
| External-chain downgrade | Conditional bridge concepts | Technical/legal/custody adoption conditions and external-finality assessment; no bridge or internal integrity guarantee. |
Existing objectives and invariants explain intended controls, not their efficacy. System and asset scope, attack analysis, residual risks and control validation require a supplied threat model and implementation evidence. Audits, penetration tests and certification remain absent.
These are stated constraints for an implementation, not properties of a running system.
Anchors are public and compact; durable evidence stays under explicit custody and retention control. Classification of which material may be anchored, which may be referenced and which may never leave custody is an open item, and is a prerequisite for any storage rail decision.
This site is documentation. It holds no accounts, no payment data and no member records; those belong to ByteShares.dk and are outside the scope of these pages.
A coordinated disclosure process requires owner-approved responsibility, a verified contact route and a defined response policy. These remain open; no response time, bounty or future publication date is promised. This page is not an operating vulnerability-reporting service.
Proposed / Non-operational — review questions, not decisions or implementation contracts.
Each statement on this page is tracked against a source. A claim without a verified source is never presented as fact.
| Claim | Source type | Verification | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security objectives, boundaries and invariants | Internal design notes | Source claimed, not yet verified | Existing public design summaries and Proposed Canon provide review context; source fidelity, adoption and implemented control verification remain separate and unresolved. |
| Threat categories and mitigations | Threat model document | No source on file | No accepted, implementation-specific threat assessment is on file. The public tables are design considerations and evidence requests, not security findings. |
| Any audit, test, certification or clean bill of health | Audit report | No source on file | No independent report is on file; no assurance is given. |